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Rawad Bitar, Yuxuan Xing, Yasaman Keshtkarjahromi, Venkat Dasari, Salim El Rouayheb, and Hulya Seferoglu
Abstract—Edge computing is emerging as a new paradigm to
allow processing data near the edge of the network, where the
data is typically generated and collected. This enables critical
computations at the edge in applications such as Internet of
Things (IoT), in which an increasing number of devices (sensors,
cameras, health monitoring devices, etc.) collect data that needs to
be processed through computationally intensive algorithms with
stringent reliability, security and latency constraints.
Our key tool is the theory of coded computation, which
advocates mixing data in computationally intensive tasks by
employing erasure codes and offloading these tasks to other
devices for computation. Coded computation is recently gaining
interest, thanks to its higher reliability, smaller delay, and
lower communication costs. In this paper, we develop a private
and rateless adaptive coded computation (PRAC) algorithm for
distributed matrix-vector multiplication by taking into account
(i) the privacy requirements of IoT applications and devices, and
(ii) the heterogeneous and time-varying resources of edge devices.
We show that PRAC outperforms known secure coded computing
methods when resources are heterogeneous. We provide theoret-
ical guarantees on the performance of PRAC and its comparison
to baselines. Moreover, we confirm our theoretical results through
simulations and implementations on Android-based smartphones.
I. INTRODUCTION
Edge computing is emerging as a new paradigm to allow
processing data near the edge of the network, where the data
is typically generated and collected. This enables computation
at the edge in applications such as Internet of Things (IoT),
in which an increasing number of devices (sensors, cameras,
health monitoring devices, etc.) collect data that needs to be
processed through computationally intensive algorithms with
stringent reliability, security and latency constraints.
One of the promising solutions to handle computationally
intensive tasks is computation offloading, which advocates
offloading tasks to remote servers or cloud. Yet, offloading
tasks to remote servers or cloud could be luxury that cannot be
afforded by most of the edge applications, where connectivity
to remote servers can be lost or compromised, which makes
edge computing crucial.
The preliminary results of this paper are presented in part at the SPIE
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Edge computing advocates that computationally intensive
tasks in a device (master) could be offloaded to other edge or
end devices (workers) in close proximity. However, offloading
tasks to other devices leaves the IoT and the applications it is
supporting at the complete mercy of an attacker. Furthermore,
exploiting the potential of edge computing is challenging
mainly due to the heterogeneous and time-varying nature
of the devices at the edge. Thus, our goal is to develop a
private, dynamic, adaptive, and heterogeneity-aware cooper-
ative computation framework that provides both privacy and
computation efficiency guarantees. Note that the application
of this work can be extended to cloud computing at remote
data-centers. However, we focus on edge computing as het-
erogeneity and time-varying resources are more prevalent at
the edge as compared to data-centers.
Our key tool is the theory of coded computation, which
advocates mixing data in computationally intensive tasks by
employing erasure codes and offloading these tasks to other
devices for computation [2]–[14]. The following canonical
example demonstrates the effectiveness of coded computation.
Example 1. Consider the setup where a master device wishes
to offload a task to 3 workers. The master has a large data
matrix A and wants to compute matrix vector product Ax. The
master device divides the matrix A row-wise equally into two
smaller matrices A1 and A2, which are then encoded using
a (3, 2) Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code1 to give
B1 = A1, B2 = A2 and B3 = A1 +A2, and sends each to a
different worker. Also, the master device sends x to workers
and ask them to compute Bix, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. When the master
receives the computed values (i.e., Bix) from at least two out
of three workers, it can decode its desired task, which is the
computation of Ax. The power of coded computations is that
it makes B3 = A1 +A2 act as a “joker” redundant task that
can replace any of the other two tasks if they end up straggling
or failing. ✷
The above example demonstrates the benefit of coding for
edge computing. However, the very nature of task offloading
from a master to worker devices makes the computation
framework vulnerable to attacks. One of the attacks, which is
also the focus of this work, is eavesdropper adversary, where
one or more of workers can behave as an eavesdropper and can
1An (n, k) MDS code divides the master’s data into k chunks and encodes
it into n chunks (n > k) such that any k chunks out of n are sufficient to
recover the original data.
2TABLE I: Example PRAC operation in heterogeneous and
time-varying setup.
Time Worker 1 Worker 2 Worker 3
1 R1 A1 +A3 +R1 A3 +R1
2 R2
3 A2 +A3 +R2
4 A2 +R2
spy on the coded data sent to these devices for computations.2
For example, B3 = A1 + A2 in Example 1 can be processed
and spied by worker 3. Even though A1 + A2 is coded, the
attacker can infer some information from this coded task.
Privacy against eavesdropper attacks is extremely important
in edge computing [15]–[17]. Thus, it is crucial to develop
a private coded computation mechanism against eavesdropper
adversary who can gain access to offloaded tasks.
In this paper, we develop a private and rateless adaptive
coded computation (PRAC) mechanism. PRAC is (i) private
as it is secure against eavesdropper adversary, (ii) rateless,
because it uses Fountain codes [18]–[20] instead of Maximum
Distance Separable (MDS) codes [21], [22], and (iii) adaptive
as the master device offloads tasks to workers by taking into
account their heterogeneous and time-varying resources. Next,
we illustrate the main idea of PRAC through an illustrative
example.
Example 2. We consider the same setup in Example 1, where
a master device offloads a task to 3 workers. The master has
a large data matrix A and wants to compute matrix vector
product Ax. The master device divides matrix A row-wise
into 3 sub-matrices A1, A2, A3; and encodes these matrices
using a Fountain code3 [18]–[20]. An example set of coded
packets is A2, A3, A1 +A3, and A2 +A3. However, prior to
sending a coded packet to a worker, the master generates a
random key matrix R with the same dimensions as Ai and with
entries drawn uniformly from the same alphabet as the entries
of A. The key matrix is added to the coded packets to provide
privacy as shown in Table I. In particular, a key matrix R1 is
created at the start of time slot 1, combined with A1+A3 and
A3, and transmitted to workers 2 and 3, respectively. R1 is
also transmitted to worker 1 in order to obtain R1x that will
help the master in the decoding process. The computation of
(A1+A3+R1)x is completed at the end of time slot 1. Thus,
at that time slot the master generates a new matrix, R2, and
sends it to worker 2. At the end of time slot 2, worker 1 finishes
its computation, therefore the master adds R2 to A2 + A3
and sends it to worker 1. A similar process is repeated at
the end of time slot 3. Now the master waits for worker 2 to
return R2x and for any other worker to return its uncompleted
task in order to decode Ax. Thanks to using key matrices R1
and R2, and assuming that workers do not collude, privacy is
2Note that this work focuses specifically on eavesdropper adversary al-
though there are other types of attacks; for example Byzantine adversary,
which is out of scope of this work.
3Fountain codes are desirable here for two properties: (i) they provide a
fluid abstraction of the coded packets so the master can always decode with
high probability as long as it collects enough packets; (ii) They have low
decoding complexity.
guaranteed. On a high level, privacy is guaranteed because
the observation of the workers is statistically independent from
the data A. ✷
This example shows that PRAC can take advantage of
coding for computation, and provide privacy.
Contributions. We design PRAC for heterogeneous and
time-varying private coded computing with colluding workers.
In particular, PRAC codes sub-tasks using Fountain codes,
and determines how many coded packets and keys each
worker should compute dynamically over time. We provide
theoretical analysis of PRAC and show that it (i) guarantees
privacy conditions, (ii) uses minimum number of keys to
satisfy privacy requirements, and (iii) maintains the desired
rateless property of non-private Fountain codes. Furthermore,
we provide a closed form task completion delay analysis of
PRAC. Finally, we evaluate the performance of PRAC via
simulations as well as in a testbed consisting of real Android-
based smartphones as compared to baselines.
The use of Fountain codes in encoding the sub-tasks pro-
vides PRAC flexibility on the number of stragglers and on
the computing capacity of workers, reflected by the number
of sub-tasks assigned to each worker. In contrast, existing
solutions for secure coded computing require the master to set
a threshold on the number of stragglers that it can tolerate and
pre-assign the sub-tasks to the workers based on this threshold.
Organization. The structure of the rest of this paper is
as follows. We start with presenting the system model in
Section II. Section III presents the design of private and
rateless adaptive coded computation (PRAC). We characterize
and analyze PRAC in Section IV. We present evaluation results
in section V. Section VI presents related work. Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Setup. We consider a master/workers setup at the edge
of the network, where the master device M offloads its
computationally intensive tasks to workers wi, i ∈ N , (where
|N | = n) via device-to-device (D2D) links such as Wi-Fi
Direct and/or Bluetooth. The master device divides a task into
smaller sub-tasks, and offloads them to workers that process
these sub-tasks in parallel.
Task Model. We focus on the computation of linear func-
tions, i.e., matrix-vector multiplication. We suppose the mas-
ter wants to compute the matrix vector product Ax, where
A ∈ Fm×ℓq can be thought of as the data matrix and x ∈ F
ℓ
q
can be thought of as an attribute vector. We assume that the
entries of A and x are drawn independently and uniformly
at random4 from Fq. The motivation stems from machine
learning applications where computing linear functions is a
building block of several iterative algorithms [23], [24]. For
instance, the main computation of a gradient descent algorithm
with squared error loss function is
x+ = x− αAT (Ax − y), (1)
4We abuse notation and denote both the random matrix representing the
data and its realization by A. We do the same for x.
3where x is the value of the attribute vector at a given iteration,
x+ is the updated value of x at this iteration and the learning
rate α is a parameter of the algorithm. Equation (1) consists of
computing two linear functions Ax and ATw , AT (Ax−y).
Worker and Attack Model. The workers incur random delays
while executing the task assigned to them by the master device.
The workers have different computation and communication
specifications resulting in a heterogeneous environment which
includes workers that are significantly slower than others,
known as stragglers. Moreover, the workers cannot be trusted
with the master’s data. We consider an eavesdropper adversary
in this paper, where one or more of workers can be eaves-
droppers and can spy on the coded data sent to these devices
for computations. We assume that up to z, z < n, workers
can collude, i.e., z workers can share the data they received
from the master in order to obtain information about A. The
parameter z can be chosen based on the desired privacy level;
a larger z means a higher privacy level and vice versa. One
would want to set z to the largest possible value for maximum,
z = n− 1 security purposes. However, this has the drawback
of increasing the complexity and the runtime of the algorithm.
In our setup we assume that z is a fixed and given system
parameter.
Coding & Secret Keys. The matrix A can be divided into
b row blocks (we assume that b divides m, otherwise all-
zero rows can be added to the matrix to satisfy this property)
denoted by Ai, i = 1, . . . , b. The master applies Fountain cod-
ing [18]–[20] across row blocks to create information packets
νj ,
∑m
i=1 ci,jAi, j = 1, 2, . . . , where the ci,j ∈ {0, 1}. Note
that an information packet is a matrix of dimension m/b× ℓ,
i.e., νj ∈ F
m/b×ℓ
q . Such rateless coding is compatible with
our goal to create adaptive coded cooperation computation
framework. In order to maintain privacy of the data, the master
device generates random matrices Ri of dimension m/b × ℓ
called keys. The entries of the Ri matrices are drawn uniformly
at random from the same field as the entries of A. Each
information packet νj is padded with a linear combination of z
keys fj(Ri,1, . . . , Ri,z) to create a secure packet sj ∈ F
m/b×ℓ
q
defined as sj , νj + fj(Ri,1, . . . , Ri,z).
The master device sends x to all workers, then it sends
the keys and the sj’s to the workers according to our PRAC
scheme described later. Each worker multiplies the received
packet by x and sends the result back to the master. Since the
encoding is rateless, the master keeps sending packets to the
workers until it can decode Ax. The master then sends a stop
message to all the workers.
Privacy Conditions. Our primary requirement is that any
collection of z (or less) workers will not be able to obtain any
information about A, in an information theoretic sense.
In particular, let Pi, i = 1 . . . , n, denote the collection of
packets sent to worker wi. For any set B ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, let
PB , {Pi, i ∈ B} denote the collection of packets given to
worker wi for all i ∈ B. The privacy requirement5 can be
5In some cases the vector x may contain information about A and therefore
must not be revealed to the workers. We explain in Appendix A how to
generalize our scheme to account for such cases.
TABLE II: Summary of notations.
Symbol Meaning
M master
wi worker i
n number of workers
A m× ℓ data matrix
x ℓ× 1 attribute vector
z number of colluding workers
m number of rows in A
ε overhead of Fountain codes
Ai i
th row block of data matrix A
R random matrix
RTTi average round trip time to send and receive packet pi
βt,i computation time of the t
th packet at wi
ν Fountain coded packet of Ai’s
s secure Fountain coded packet
Ti time to compute a packet at wi
T(d) d
th order statistic of Ti’s
T time spent by M to decode Ax
expressed as
H(A|PZ) = H(A), ∀Z ⊆ {1, . . . , n} s.t. |Z| ≤ z. (2)
H(A) denotes the entropy, or uncertainty, about A and
H(A|PZ) denotes the uncertainty about A after observing PZ .
Delay Model. Each packet transmitted from the master
to a worker wi, i = 1, 2, ..., n, experiences the following
delays: (i) transmission delay for sending the packet from the
master to the worker, (ii) computation delay for computing
the multiplication of the packet by the vector x, and (iii)
transmission delay for sending the computed packet from
the worker wi back to the master. We denote by βt,i the
computation time of the tth packet at worker wi and RTTi
denotes the average round-trip time spent to send and receive
a packet from worker wi. The time spent by the master is
equal to the time taken by the (z+1)st fastest worker to finish
its assigned tasks.
III. DESIGN OF PRAC
A. Overview
We present the detailed explanation of PRAC. Let pt,i ∈
F
m/b×ℓ
q be the tth packet sent to worker wi. This packet can be
either a key or a secure packet. For each value of t, the master
sends z keys denoted by Rt,1, . . . , Rt,z to z different workers
and up to n−z secure packets st,1, . . . , st,n−z to the remaining
workers. The master needs the results of b + ǫ information
packets, i.e., νt,ix, to decode the final result Ax, where ǫ is the
overhead required by Fountain coding6. To obtain the results of
b+ ǫ information packets, the master needs the results of b+ ǫ
secure packets, st,ix = (νi,j + fj(Rt,i, . . . , Rt,z))x, together
with all the corresponding7 Rt,ix, i = 1, . . . , z. Therefore,
only the results of the st,ix for which all the computed keys
6The overhead required by Fountain coding is typically as low as 5% [20],
i.e., ǫ = 0.05b
7Recall that fj(Rt,1, . . . , Rt,z) is a linear function, thus it is easy to
extract (Rt,i)x, i = 1, ..., z, from (fj(Rt,1, . . . , Rt,z))x.
4TABLE III: Depiction of PRAC in the presence of stragglers. The master keeps generating packets using Fountain codes until
it can decode Ax. The master estimates the average task completion time of each worker and sends a new packet to avoid
idle time. Each new packet sent to a worker must be secured with a new random key. The master can decode A1x, . . . , A6x
after receiving all the packets not having R4,1 or R4,2 in them.
Time Worker 1 Worker 2 Worker 3 Worker 4
1 R1,1 R1,2 A4 +R1,1 + R1,2 A3 +A4 +A6 +R1,1 + 2R1,2
2 R2,1
3 R2,2
4 A3 +R2,1 +R2,2 A4 +A5 + R2,1 + 2R2,2
5 R3,1
6 A2 + R3,1 + R3,2 R3,2
7 R4,1 A1 + R3,1 + 2R3,2
8 R4,2 A2 +A3 + R4,1 + R4,2
Rt,ix, i = 1, ..., z, are received by the master can account for
the total of b + ǫ information packets.
B. Dynamic Rate Adaptation
The dynamic rate adaptation part of PRAC is based on [2].
In particular, the master offloads coded packets gradually to
workers and receives two ACKs for each transmitted packet;
one confirming the receipt of the packet by the worker, and
the second one (piggybacked to the computed packet) showing
that the packet is computed by the worker. Then, based on the
frequency of the received ACKs, the master decides to transmit
more/less coded packets to that worker. In particular, each
packet pt,i is transmitted to each worker wi before or right
after the computed packet pt−1,ix is received at the master.
For this purpose, the average per packet computing time E[βt,i]
is calculated for each worker wi dynamically based on the
previously received ACKs. Each packet pt,i is transmitted after
waiting E[βt,i] from the time pt−1,i is sent or right after packet
pt−1,ix is received at the master, thus reducing the idle time
at the workers. This policy is shown to approach the optimal
task completion delay and maximizes the workers’ efficiency
and is shown to improve task completion time significantly
compared with the literature [2].
C. Coding
We explain the coding scheme used in PRAC. We start
with an example to build an intuition and illustrate the scheme
before going into details.
Example 3. Assume there are n = 4 workers out of which
any z = 2 can collude. Let A and x be the data owned by the
master and the vector to be multiplied by A, respectively. The
master sends x to all the workers. For the sake of simplicity,
assume A can be divided into b = 6 row blocks, i.e., A =[
AT1 A
T
2 . . . A
T
6
]T
. The master encodes the Ai’s using
Fountain code. We denote by round the event when the master
sends a new packet to a worker. For example, we say that
worker 1 is at round 3 if it has received 3 packets so far. For
every round t, the master generates z = 2 random matrices
Rt,1, Rt,2 (with the same size as A1) and encodes them using
an (n, z) = (4, 2) systematic maximum distance separable
(MDS) code by multiplying Rt,1, Rt,2 by a generator matrix
G as follows
G
[
Rt,1
Rt,2
]
,


1 0
0 1
1 1
1 2


[
Rt,1
Rt,2
]
. (3)
This results in the encoded matrices of Rt,1, Rt,2, Rt,1 +
Rt,2, and Rt,1 + 2Rt,2. Now let us assume that workers can
be stragglers. At the beginning, the master initializes all the
workers at round 1. Afterwards, when a worker wi finishes
its task, the master checks how many packets this worker has
received so far and how many other workers are at this round.
If this worker wi is the first or second to be at round t, the
master generates Rt,1 or Rt,2, respectively, and sends it to
wi. Otherwise, if wi is the j
th worker (j > 2) to be at round
t, the master multiplies
[
Rt,1 Rt,2
]T
by the j th row of G,
adds it to a generated Fountain coded packet, and sends it to
wi. The master keeps sending packets to the workers until it
can decode Ax. We illustrate the idea in Table III.
We now explain the details of PRAC in the presence of z
colluding workers.
1) Initialization: The master divides A into b row blocks
A1, . . . , Ab and sends the vector x to the workers. Let
G ∈ Fn×zq , q > n, be the generator matrix of an (n, z)
systematic MDS code. For example one may use system-
atic Reed-Solomon codes that use Vandermondematrix as
generator matrix, see for example [25]. The master gener-
ates z random matrices R1,1, . . . , R1,z and encodes them
using G. Each coded key can be denoted by giR where
gi is the i
th row of G and R ,
[
RT1,1 . . . R
T
1,z
]T
.
The master sends the z keys R1,1, . . . , R1,z to the first z
workers, generates n − z Fountain coded packets of the
Ai’s, adds to each packet an encoded random key giR,
i = z + 1, . . . n, and sends them to the remaining n− z
workers.
2) Encoding and adaptivity: When the master wants to
send a new packet to a worker (noting that a packet
pt,i is transmitted to worker wi before, or right after,
the computed packet pt−1,ix is received at the master
according to the strategy described in Section III-B), it
checks at which round this worker is, i.e., how many
packets this worker has received so far, and checks how
5many other workers are at least at this round. Assume
worker wi is at round t and j−1 other workers are at least
at this round. If j ≤ z, the master generates and sends
Rt,j to the worker. However, if j > z the master generates
a Fountain coded packet of the Ai’s (e.g., A1+A2), adds
to it gjR and sends the packet (A1 + A2 + gjR) to the
worker. Each worker computes the multiplication of the
received packet by the vector x and sends the result to
the master.
3) Decoding and speed: Let τi denote the number of packets
sent to worker i. We define τmax , maxi τi such that
at the end of the process the master has Rt,ix for all
t = 1, . . . , τmax and all i = 1, . . . , z. The master can
therefore subtract Rt,i, t = 1, . . . , τmax and i = 1, . . . , z,
from all received secure information packets, and thus
can decode the Ai’s using the Fountain code decoding
process. The number of secure packets that can be used
to decode the Ai’s is dictated by the (z + 1)
st fastest
worker, i.e., the master can only use the results of secure
information packets computed at a given round if at least
z+1 workers have completed that round. If for example
the z fastest workers have completed round 100 and the
(z + 1)st fastest worker has completed round 20, the
master can only use the packets belonging to the first
20 rounds. The reason is that the master needs all the
keys corresponding to a given round in order to use the
secure information packet for decoding. In Lemma 2 we
prove that this scheme is optimal, i.e., in private coded
computing the master cannot use the packets computed
at rounds finished by less than z+1 workers irrespective
of the coding scheme.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF PRAC
A. Privacy
In this section, we provide theoretical analysis of PRAC by
particularly focusing on its privacy properties.
Theorem 1. PRAC is a rateless real-time adaptive coded com-
puting scheme that allows a master device to run distributed
linear computation on private data A via n workers while
satisfying the privacy constraint given in (2) for a given z < n.
Proof. Since the random keys are generated independently at
each round, it is sufficient to study the privacy of the data on
one round and the privacy generalizes to the whole algorithm.
We show that for any subset Z ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, |Z| = z, the
collection of packets pZ , {pt,i, i ∈ Z} sent at round t reveals
no information about the data A as given in (2), i.e., H(A) =
H(A|pZ). Let K denote the random variable representing all
the keys generated at round t, then it is enough to show that
H(K|A, pZ) = 0 as detailed in Appendix B. Therefore, we
need to show that given A as side information, any z workers
can decode the random keys Rt,1, . . . , Rt,z . Without loss of
generality assume the workers are ordered from fastest to
slowest, i.e., worker w1 is the fastest at the considered round t.
Since the master sends z random keys to the fastest z workers,
then pt,i = Rt,i, i = 1, . . . , z. The remaining n−z packets are
secure information packets sent to the remaining n−z workers,
i.e., pt,i = st,i = νt,i + f(Rt,1, . . . , Rt,z), where νt,i is a
linear combination of row blocks of A and f(Rt,1, . . . , Rt,z)
is a linear combination of the random keys generated at round
t. Given the data A as side information, any collection of z
packets can be expressed as z codewords of the (n, z) MDS
code encoding the random keys. Thus, given the matrix A,
any collection of z packets is enough to decode all the keys
and H(K|S, pZ) = 0 which concludes the proof.
Remark 1. PRAC requires the master to wait for the (z+1)st
fastest worker in order to be able to decode Ax. We show
in Lemma 2 that this limitation is a byproduct of all private
coded computing schemes.
Remark 2. PRAC uses the minimum number of keys required
to guarantee the privacy constraints. At each round PRAC
uses exactly z random keys which is the minimum amount of
required keys (c.f. Equation (12) in Appendix B).
Lemma 2. Any private coded computing scheme for dis-
tributed linear computation limits the master to the speed of
the (z + 1)st fastest worker.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 2 is provided in Appendix C.
B. Task Completion Delay
In this section, we characterize the task completion delay
of PRAC and compare it with Staircase codes [3], which are
secure against eavesdropping attacks in a coded computation
setup with homogeneous resources. First, we start with task
completion delay characterization of PRAC.
Theorem 3. Let b be the number of row blocks in A, let βt,i
denote the computation time of the tth packet at worker wi and
let RTTi denote the average round-trip time spent to send and
receive a packet from worker i. The task completion time of
PRAC is approximated as
TPRAC ≈ max
i∈{1,...,n}
{RTTi}+
b+ ǫ∑n
i=z+1 1/E[βt,i]
, (4)
≈
b+ ǫ∑n
i=z+1 1/E[βt,i]
, (5)
where wi’s are ordered indices of the workers from fastest to
slowest, i.e., w1 = argmini E[βt,i].
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3 is provided in Appendix D.
Now that we characterized the task completion delay of
PRAC, we can compare it with the state-of-the-art. Secure
coded computing schemes that exist in the literature usually
use static task allocation, where tasks are assigned to workers
a priori. The most recent work in the area is Staircase codes,
which is shown to outperform all existing schemes that use
threshold secret sharing [3]. However, Staircase codes are
static; they allocate fixed amount of tasks to workers a priori.
Thus, Staircase codes cannot leverage the heterogeneity of
the system, neither can it adapt to a system that is changing
in time. On the other hand, our solution PRAC adaptively
offloads tasks to workers by taking into account the het-
erogeneity and time-varying nature of resources at workers.
6Therefore, we restrict our focus on comparing PRAC to
Staircase codes.
Staircase codes assigns a task of size b/(k−z) row blocks to
each worker.8 Let Ti be the time spent at worker i to compute
the whole assigned task. Denote by T(i) the i
th order statistic
of the Ti’s and by TSC(n, k, z) the task completion time, i.e.,
time the master waits until it can decode Ax, when using
Staircase codes. In order to decode Ax the master needs to
receive a fraction equal to (k−z)/(d−z) of the task assigned
to each worker from any d workers where k ≤ d ≤ n. The
task completion time of the master can then be expressed as
[3]
TSC(n, k, z) = min
d∈{k,...,n}
{
k − z
d− z
T(d)
}
. (6)
Theorem 4. The gap between the completion time of PRAC
and coded computation using staircase codes is lower bounded
by:
E[TSC]− E [TPRAC ] ≥
bx− ǫy
y(x+ y)
, (7)
where x =
n− d∗
E[βt,n]
, y =
d∗ − z
E[βt,d∗ ]
and d∗ is the value of d
that minimizes equation (6).
Proof. The proof of Theorem 4 is provided in Appendix E.
Theorem 4 shows that the lower bound on the gap between
secure coded computation using staircase codes and PRAC is
in the order of number of row blocks of A. Hence, the gap
between secure coded computation using Staircase codes and
PRAC is linearly increasing with the number of row blocks
of A. Note that, ǫ, the required overhead by fountain coding
used in PRAC, becomes negligible as b increases.
Thus, PRAC outperforms secure coded computation using
Staircase codes in heterogeneous systems. The more heteroge-
neous the workers are, the more improvement is obtained by
using PRAC. However, Staircase codes can slightly outperform
PRAC in the case where the slowest n − z workers are
homogeneous, i.e., have similar compute service times Ti. In
this case both algorithms are restricted to the slowest n − z
workers (see Lemma 2), but PRAC incurs an ǫ overhead of
tasks (due to using Fountain codes) which is not needed for
Staircase codes. In particular, from (5) and (6), when the n−z
slowest workers are homogeneous, the task completion time
of PRAC and Staircase codes are equal to b+ǫn−zE[βt,n] and
b
n−zE[βt,n], respectively.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulations
In this section, we present simulations run on MATLAB,
and compare PRAC with the following baselines: (i) Staircase
codes [3], (ii) C3P [2] (which is not secure as it is not designed
to be secure), and (iii) Genie C3P (GC3P) that extends C3P
by assuming a knowledge of the identity of the eavesdroppers
8Note that in addition to n and z, all threshold secret sharing based schemes
require a parameter k, z < k < n, which is the minimum number of non
stragglers that the master has to wait for before decoding Ax.
and ignoring them. We note that GC3P serves as a lower
bound on private coded computing schemes for heterogeneous
systems9 for the following reason: for a given number of z
colluding workers the ideal coded computing scheme knows
which workers are eavesdroppers and ignores them to use
the remaining workers without need of randomness. If the
identity of the colluding workers is unknown, coded com-
puting schemes require randomness and become limited to
the (z + 1)st fastest worker (Lemma 2). GC3P and other
coded computing schemes have similar performance if the z
colluding workers are the fastest workers. If the z colluding
workers are the slowest, then GC3P outperforms any coded
computing scheme. Note that our solution PRAC considers
the scenario of unknown eavesdroppers. Comparing PRAC
with G3CP shows how good PRAC is as compared to the
best possible solution for heterogeneous systems. In terms of
comparing PRAC to solutions designed for the homogeneous
setting, we restrict our attention to Staircase codes which are
a class of secret sharing schemes that enjoys a flexibility in
the number of workers needed to decode the matrix-vector
multiplication. Staircase codes are shown to outperform any
coded computing scheme that requires a threshold on the
number of stragglers [3].
In our simulations, we model the computation time of each
worker wi by an independent shifted exponential random
variable with rate λi and shift ci, i.e., F (Ti = t) = 1 −
exp(−λi(t − ci)). We take ci = 1/λi and consider three
different scenarios for choosing the values of λi’s for the
workers as follows:
• Scenario 1: we assign λi = 3 for half of the workers,
then we assign λi = 1 for one quarter of the workers and
assign λi = 9 for the remaining workers.
• Scenario 2: we assign λi = 1 for one third of the workers,
the second third have λi = 3 and the remaining workers
have λi = 9.
• Scenario 3: we draw the λi’s independently and uni-
formly at random from the interval [0.5, 9].
When running Staircase codes, we choose the parameter
k that minimizes the task completion time for the desired n
and z. We do so by simulating Staircase codes for all possible
values of k, z ≤ k ≤ n, and choose the one with the minimum
completion time.
We take b = m, i.e., each row block is simply a row of A.
The size of each element of A and vector x are assumed to
be 1 Byte (or 8 bits). Therefore, the size of each transmitted
packet pt,i is 8 ∗ ℓ bits. For the simulation results, we assume
that the matrix A is a square matrix, i.e., l = m. We take
m = 1000, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Ci denotes the
average channel capacity of each worker wi and is selected
uniformly from the interval [10, 20]Mbps. The rate of sending
a packet to worker wi is sampled from a Poisson distribution
with mean Ci.
In Figure 1 we show the effect of the number of rows m
on the completion time at the master. We fix the number of
9If the system is homogeneous Staircase codes outperform GC3P, because
pre-allocating tasks to the workers avoids the overhead needed by Fountain
codes.
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(a) Scenario 1 with the fastest 13 workers
as eavesdropper for GC3P 1 and the slowest
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(b) Scenario 2 with 13 workers picked at
random to be eavesdroppers.
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(c) Scenario 3 with 13 workers picked at
random to be eavesdroppers.
Fig. 1: Comparison between PRAC and the baselines Staircase codes, GC3P, and C3P in different scenarios with n = 50
workers and z = 13 colluding eavesdroppers for different values of the number of rows m. For each value of m we run
100 experiments and average the results. When the eavesdropper are chosen to be the fastest workers, PRAC has very similar
performance to GC3P. When the eavesdroppers are picked randomly, the performance of PRAC becomes closer to this of
GC3P when the non adversarial workers are more heterogeneous.
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(a) Task completion time as a function of the number of workers
with z = n/4.
20 40 60 80 100
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Number of workers n
A
v
er
ag
e
co
m
p
le
ti
o
n
ti
m
e
Staircase codes
PRAC
GC3P
C3P
(b) Task completion time as a function of the number of workers
with z = 13.
Fig. 2: Comparison between PRAC, Staircase codes and GC3P in scenario 1 for different values of the number workers and
number of colluding workers. We fix the number of rows to m = 1000. For each value of the x-axis we run 100 experiments
and average the results. We observe that the difference between the completion time of PRAC and this of GC3P is large for
small values of n− z and decreases with the increase of n− z.
workers to 50 and the number of colluding workers to 13 and
plot the completion time for PRAC, C3P, GC3P and Staircase
codes. Notice that PRAC and Staircase codes have close
completion time in scenario 1 (Figure 3a) and this completion
time is far from that of C3P. The reason is that in this scenario
we pick exactly 13 workers to be fast (λi = 9) and the others
to be significantly slower. Since PRAC assigns keys to the
fastest z workers, the completion time is dictated by the slow
workers. To compare PRAC with Staircase codes notice that
the majority of the remaining workers have λi = 3 therefore
pre-allocating equal tasks to the workers is close to adaptively
allocating the tasks.
In terms of lower bound on PRAC, observe that when
the fastest workers are assumed to be adversarial, GC3P and
PRAC have very similar task completion time. However, when
the slowest workers are assumed to be adversarial the comple-
tion of GC3P is very close to C3P and far from PRAC. This
observation is in accordance with Lemma 2. In scenarios 2 and
3 we pick the adversarial workers uniformly at random and
observe that the completion time of PRAC becomes closer to
GC3P when the workers are more heterogeneous. For instance,
in scenario 3, GC3P and PRAC have closer performance when
the workers’ computing times are chosen uniformly at random
from the interval [0.5, 9].
In Figure 2, we plot the task completion time as a function
of the number of workers n for a fixed number of rows m =
1000 and λi’s assigned according to scenario 1. In Figure 2(a),
we change the number of workers from 10 to 100 and keep
the ratio z/n = 1/4 fixed. We notice that with the increase of
n the completion time of PRAC becomes closer to GC3P. In
Figure 2(b), we change the number of workers from 20 to 100
and keep z = 13 fixed. We notice that with the increase of n,
the effect of the eavesdropper is amortized and the completion
time of PRAC becomes closer to C3P. In this setting, PRAC
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(a) Task completion time as a function of the number of
colluding workers for n = 50. Computing time of the workers
are chosen according to scenario 1.
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(b) Task completion time for n = 50 workers and variable z.
Computing times of the workers are chosen such that the n− z
slowest workers are homogeneous.
Fig. 3: Comparison between PRAC and Staircase codes average completion time as a function of number of colluding workers
z. We fix the number of rows to m = 1000. Both codes are affected by the increase of number of colluding helpers because
their runtime is restricted to the slowest n− z workers. We observe that PRAC outperforms Staircase codes except when the
n− z slowest workers are homogeneous.
always outperforms Staircase codes.
In Figure 3, we plot the task completion time as a function
of the number of colluding workers. In Figure 3(a), we choose
the computing time at the workers according to scenario 1. We
change z from 1 to 40 and observe that the completion time
of PRAC deviates from that of GC3P with the increase of
z. More importantly, we observe two inflection points of the
average completion time of PRAC at z = 13 and z = 37.
Those inflection points are due to the fact that we have 12
fast workers (λ = 9) and 25 workers with medium speed
(λ = 3) in the system. For z > 36, the completion time of
Staircase codes becomes less than that of PRAC because the 14
slowest workers are homogeneous. Therefore, pre-allocating
the tasks is better than using Fountain codes and paying for
the overhead of computations. To confirm that Staircase codes
always outperforms PRAC when the slowest n − z workers
are homogeneous, we run a simulation in which we divide the
workers into three clusters. The first cluster consists of ⌊z/2⌋
fast workers (λ = 9), the second consists of ⌊z/2⌋+1 workers
that are regular (λ = 3) and the remaining n− z workers are
slow (λ = 1). In Figure 3(b) we fix n to 50 and change z from
1 to 40. We observe that Staircase codes always outperform
PRAC in this setting. In contrast to non secure C3P, Staircase
codes and PRAC are always restricted to the slowest n − z
workers and cannot leverage the increase of the number of
fast workers. For GC3P, we assume that the fastest workers
are eavesdroppers. We note that as expected from Lemma 2,
when the fastest workers are assumed to be eavesdroppers the
performance of GC3P and PRAC becomes very close.
B. Experiments
Setup. The master device is a Nexus 5 Android-based
smartphone running 6.0.1. The worker devices are Nexus
6Ps running Android 8.1.0. The master device connects to
worker devices via Wi-Fi Direct links and the master is the
group owner of Wi-Fi Direct group. The master device is
required to complete one matrix multiplication (y = Ax)
where A is of dimensions 60 × 10000 and x is a 10000× 1
vector. We also take m = b i.e., each packet is a row of
A. We introduced an artificial delay at the workers following
an exponential distribution. The introduced delays serves to
emulate applications running in the background of the devices.
A worker device sends the result to the master after it is done
calculating and the introduced delay has passed. Furthermore,
we assume that z = 1 i.e., there is one unknown worker
that is adversarial among all the workers. The experiments are
conducted in a lab environment where there are other Wi-Fi
networks operating in the background.
Baselines. Our PRAC algorithm is compared to three base-
line algorithms: (i) Staircase codes that preallocate the tasks
based on n, the number of workers, k, the minimum number
of workers required to reconstruct the information, and z, the
number of colluding workers; (ii) GC3P in which we assume
the adversarial worker is known and excluded during the task
allocation; (iii) Non secure C3P in which the security problem
is ignored and the master device will utilize every resource
without randomness. In this setup we run C3P on n − z
workers.
Results. Figure 4 presents the task completion time with
increasing number of workers for the homogeneous setup, i.e.,
when all the workers have similar computing times. Comput-
ing delay for each packet follows an exponential distribution
with mean µ = 1/λ = 3 seconds in all workers. C3P performs
the best in terms of completion time, but C3P does not provide
any privacy guarantees. PRAC outperforms Staircase codes
when the number of workers is 5. The reason is that PRAC per-
forms better than Staircase codes in heterogeneous setup, and
when the number of workers increases, the system becomes
a bit more heterogeneous. GC3P significantly outperforms
PRAC in terms of completion time. Yet, it requires a prior
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Fig. 4: Completion time as function of the number of workers
in homogeneous setup.
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(b) We assume a slow worker is adversarial for GC3P.
Fig. 5: Completion time as function of the number of workers
in heterogeneous setup.
knowledge of which worker is adversarial, which is often not
available in real world scenarios.
Now, we focus on heterogeneous setup. We group the
workers into two groups; fast workers (per task delay follows
exponential delay with mean 2 seconds) and slow workers
(per task delay follows exponential distribution with mean 5
seconds). Figure 5 presents the completion time as a function
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Fig. 6: Completion time as function of the number of workers
in heterogeneous setup.
of number of workers. In this setup, for the n-worker scenario,
there are
⌈
n
2
⌉
fast and
⌊
n
2
⌋
slow workers. The difference
between the setups of Figure 5(a) and Figure 5(b) is that
we remove a fast worker (as adversarial) for GC3P in the
former, whereas in the latter, we assume that the eavesdropper
is a slow worker. As illustrated in Figure 5, for the 2-worker
case, due to the 5% overhead introduced by Fountain codes,
PRAC performs worse than Staircase code. However, PRAC
outperforms Staircase codes in terms of completion time for
3, 4, and 5 worker cases. This is due to the fact that PRAC
can utilize results calculated by slow workers more effectively
when the number of workers is large. On the other hand,
the results computed by slow workers are often discarded in
Staircase codes, which is a waste of computation resources.
If a fast worker is removed as adversarial for GC3P, the
difference between the performance of GC3P and PRAC
becomes smaller. This result is intuitive as, in PRAC, the
master has to wait for the (z + 1)st fastest worker to decode
Ax, which is also the case for GC3P in this setting.
In Figure 6, we consider the same setup with the exception
that for the n-worker scenario, there are
⌈
n
2
⌉
slow and
⌊
n
2
⌋
fast
workers. Staircase codes perform more closely to PRAC in the
3-worker case as compared to Figure 5 since the setup of Fig.6
assumes that the n-z=2 slowest workers are homogeneous,
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whereas in Fig.5 the n-z=2 slowest workers are heterogeneous.
Yet, for 5-worker case, PRAC outperforms Staircase codes
when comparing to Figure 5 since PRAC is adaptive to time-
varying resources while Staircase codes assigns tasks a priori
in a static manner.
Note that in all experiments when n−z slowest workers are
homogeneous Staircase codes outperform GC3P and PRAC.
This happens because pre-allocating the tasks to the workers
avoids the overhead of sub-tasks required by Fountain codes
and utilizes all the workers to their fullest capacity.
VI. RELATED WORK
Mobile cloud computing is a rapidly growing field with the
aim of providing better experience of quality and extensive
computing resources to mobile devices [26], [27]. The main
solution to mobile computing is to offload tasks to the cloud
or to neighboring devices by exploiting connectivity of the
devices. With task offloading come several challenges such
as heterogeneity of the devices, time varying communication
channels and energy efficiency, see e.g., [28]–[31]. We refer
interested reader to [2] and references within for a detailed
literature on edge computing and mobile cloud computing.
The problem of stragglers in distributed systems is initially
studied by the distributed computing community, see e.g.,
[32]–[35]. Research interest in using coding theoretical tech-
niques for straggler mitigation in distributed content download
and distributed computing is rapidly growing. The early body
of work focused on content download, see e.g., [36]–[40].
Using codes for straggler mitigation in distributed computing
started in [12] where the authors proposed the use of MDS
codes for distributed linear machine learning algorithms in
homogeneous workers setting.
Following the work of [12], coding schemes for straggler
mitigation in distributed matrix-matrix multiplication, coded
computing and machine learning algorithms are introduced
and the fundamental limits between the computation load and
the communication cost are studied, see e.g., [8], [41] and
references within for matrix-matrix multiplication, see [4], [7],
[10]–[13], [42]–[49] for machine learning algorithms and [5],
[6], [9], [50] and references within for other topics.
Codes for privacy and straggler mitigation in distributed
computing are first introduced in [3] where the authors con-
sider a homogeneous setting and focus on matrix-vector mul-
tiplication. Beyond matrix-vector multiplication, the problem
of private distributed matrix-matrix multiplication and private
polynomial computation with straggler tolerance is studied
[51]–[56]. The former works are designed for the homoge-
neous static setting in which the master has a prior knowledge
on the computation capacities of the workers and pre-assigns
the sub-tasks equally to them. In addition, the master sets
a threshold on the number of stragglers that it can tolerate
throughout the whole process. In contrast, PRAC is designed
for the heterogeneous dynamic setting in which workers have
different computation capacities that can change over time.
PRAC assigns the sub-tasks to the workers in an adaptive
manner based on the estimated computation capacity of each
worker. Furthermore, PRAC can tolerate a varying number of
stragglers as it uses an underlying rateless code, which gives
the master a higher flexibility in adaptively assigning the sub-
tasks to the workers. Those properties of PRAC allow a better
use of the workers over the whole process. On the other hand,
PRAC is restricted to matrix-vector multiplication. Although
coded computation is designed for linear operations, there
is a recent effort to apply coded computation for non-linear
operations. For example, [57] applied coded computation to
logistic regression, and the framework of Gradient coding
started in [10] generalizes to any gradient-descent algorithm.
Our work is complementary with these works. For example,
our work can be directly used as complementary to [57]
to provide privacy and adaptive task offloading to logistic
regression.
Secure multi-party communication (SMPC) [58] can be
related to our work as follows. The setting of secure multi-
party computing schemes assumes the presence of several
parties (masters in our terminology) who want to compute
a function of all the data owned by the different parties
without revealing any information about the individual data
of each party. This setting is a generalized version of the
master/worker setting that we consider. More precisely, an
SMPC scheme reduces to our Master/worker setting if we
assume that only one party owns data and the others have no
data to include in the function to be computed. SMPC schemes
use threshold secret sharing schemes, therefore they restrict
the master to a fixed number of stragglers. Thus, showing
that PRAC outperforms Staircase codes (which are the best
known family of threshold secret sharing schemes) implies that
PRAC outperform the use of SMPC schemes that are reduced
to this setting. Works on privacy-preserving machine learning
algorithms are also related to our work. However, the privacy
constraint in this line of work is computational privacy and
the proposed solutions do not take stragglers into account, see
e.g., [59]–[61].
We restrict the scope of this paper to eavesdropping at-
tacks, which are important on their own merit. Privacy and
security can be achieved by using Maximum Distance Sepa-
rable (MDS)-like codes which restrict the master to a fixed
maximum number of stragglers [52], [55]. Our solution on
the other hand addresses the privacy problem in an adaptive
coded computation setup without such a restriction. In this
setup, security cannot be addressed by expanding the results
of [52], [55]. In fact, we developed a secure adaptive coded
computation mechanism in our recent paper [62] against
Byzantine attacks. The private and secure adaptive coded
computation obtained by combining this paper and [62] is out
of scope of this paper.
VII. CONCLUSION
The focus of this paper is to develop a secure edge com-
puting mechanism to mitigate the computational bottleneck
of IoT devices by allowing these devices to help each other
in their computations, with possible help from the cloud if
available. Our key tool is the theory of coded computation,
which advocates mixing data in computationally intensive
tasks by employing erasure codes and offloading these tasks
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to other devices for computation. Focusing on eavesdropping
attacks, we designed a private and rateless adaptive coded
computation (PRAC) mechanism considering (i) the privacy
requirements of IoT applications and devices, and (ii) the
heterogeneous and time-varying resources of edge devices.
Our proposed PRAC model can provide adequate security
and latency guarantees to support real-time computation at
the edge. We showed through analysis, MATLAB simulations,
and experiments on Android-based smartphones that PRAC
outperforms known secure coded computing methods when
resources are heterogeneous.
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APPENDIX A
HIDING THE VECTOR x
In machine learning applications, the master runs iterative
algorithms in which the vector x contains information about
A and needs to be hidden from the workers. We describe how
PRAC can be generalized to achieve privacy for both A and
x. The idea is to divide the n workers into two disjoint groups
and ask each of them to privately multiply A by a vector that
is statistically independent of x. In addition, the master should
be able to decode Ax from the results of both multiplications.
The scheme works as follows. The master divides the workers
into two groups of cardinality n1 and n2 such that n1+n2 = n
and chooses the security parameters z1 < n1 and z2 < n2.
To hide x, the master generates a random vector u of same
size as x and sends x + u to the first group and u to the
second group. Afterwards, the master applies PRAC on both
groups. According to our scheme, the master decodesA(x+u)
and Au after receiving enough responses from the workers of
each group. Hence, the master can decode Ax. Note that no
information about x is revealed because it is one-time padded
by u. Note that here we assume workers from group 1 do
not collude with workers from group 2. The same idea can be
generalized to the case where workers from different groups
can collude by creating more groups and encoding x using an
appropriate secret sharing scheme. For instance, if the master
divides the workers into 3 groups and workers from any 2
different groups can collude, the master encodes x into u1,
u2 and u1 + u2 + x and sends each vector to a different
group.
APPENDIX B
EXTENSION OF PROOF OF PRIVACY (I.E., THEOREM 1)
Since at each round we generate new random matrices, it is
enough to study the privacy condition at one round. Consider
a given round t of PRAC. Let Pi denote the random variable
representing packet pi sent to worker wi. For any subset Z ⊂
{1, . . . , n}, |Z| = z, denote by PZ the collection of packets
indexed by Z , i.e., PZ = {pi; i ∈ Z}. We prove that the
perfect secrecy constraint H(A | PZ) = H(A), given in (2),
is equivalent to H(K | PZ , A) = 0. The proof is standard
[63]–[65] but we reproduce it here for completeness. In what
follows, the logarithms in the entropy function are taken base
q, where q is a power of prime for which all matrices can be
defined in a finite field Fq . We can write,
H(A | PZ) = H(A)−H(PZ) +H(PZ | A) (8)
= H(A)−H(PZ) +H(PZ | A)−H(PZ | A,K)
(9)
= H(A)−H(PZ) + I(PZ ;K | A) (10)
= H(A)−H(PZ) +H(K | A)−H(K | PZ , A)
(11)
= H(A)−H(PZ) +H(K)−H(K | PZ , A)
(12)
= H(A)− z + z −H(K | PZ , A) (13)
= H(A)−H(K | PZ , A). (14)
Equation (9) follows from the fact that given the data A
and the keys R1, . . . , Rz all packets generated by the master
can be decoded, in particular the packets PZ received by
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any z workers can be decoded, i.e., H(PZ | A,K) = 0.
Equation (12) follows because the random matrices are chosen
independently from the data matrix A and equation (13) fol-
lows because PRAC uses z independent random matrices that
are chosen uniformly at random from the field Fq . Therefore,
proving that H(A|PZ) = H(A) is equivalent to proving that
H(K | PZ , A) = 0. In other words, we need to prove that
the random matrices can be decoded given the collection of
packets sent to any z workers and the data matrix A. This is
the main reason behind encoding the random matrices using an
(n, z) MDS code. We formally prove that H(K | PZ , A) = 0
in the proof of Theorem 1. Note from equation (12) that for
any code to be information theoretically private,H(K) cannot
be less then H(PZ) = z. This means that a secure code must
use at least z independent random matrices.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We prove the lemma by contradiction. Assume that there
exists a private coded computing scheme for distributed linear
computation that is secure against z colluding workers and
allows the master to decode Ax using the help of the fastest z
workers. Without loss of generality, assume that the workers
are ordered from the fastest to the slowest, i.e., worker w1
is the fastest and worker wn is the slowest. The previous
assumption implies that the results sent from the first z workers
contain information about Ax, otherwise the master would
have to wait at least for the (z + 1)st fastest worker to
decode Ax. By linearity of the multiplication Ax, decoding
information about Ax from the results of z workers implies
decoding information about A from the packets sent to those
z workers. Hence, there exists a set of z workers for which
H(S|PZ) 6= 0, where PZ denotes the tasks allocated to a
subset Z ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of z workers, hence violating the
privacy constraint. Therefore, any private coded computing
scheme for linear computation limits the master to the speed
of the (z + 1)st fastest worker in order to decode the wanted
result.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The total delay for receiving τi computed packets from
worker wi is equal to
Ti ≈ RTTi + τiE[βt,i] ≈ τiE[βt,i]
where RTTi is the average transmission delay for sending one
packet to worker wi and receiving one computed packet from
the worker, βt,i is the computation time spent on multiplying
packet pt,i by x at worker wi, and the average E[βt,i] is
taken over all τi packets. The reason is that PRAC is a
dynamic algorithm that sends packets to each worker wi with
the interval of E[βt,i] between each two consecutive packets
and it utilizes the resources of workers fully [66]. The reason
behind counting only one round-trip time (RTT) in Ti is that
in PRAC, the packets are being transmitted to the workers
while the previously transmitted packets are being computed
at the worker. Therefore, in the overall delay only one RTTi
is required for sending the first packet p1,i to worker wi and
receiving the last computed packet pτi,ix at the master. To
approximate the total delay, we assume that the transmission
delay of one packet is negligible compared to the computing
delay of all τi packets, which is a valid assumption in practice
for IoT-devices at the edge.
On the other hand, in PRAC, the master stops sending
packets to workers as soon as it collectively receives b + ǫ
computed packets from the n − z slowest workers (note
that b + ǫ is the number of computed packets required for
successful decoding, where ǫ is the overhead due to Fountain
Coding), i.e.,
∑n
i=z+1 τi = b + ǫ. Note that the z fastest
workers are assigned for computing the keys as described
in the previous sections. Due to efficiently using the re-
sources of workers by PRAC, all n − z workers will finish
computing τi packets approximately at the same time, i.e.,
TPRAC ≈ Ti ≈ τiE[βt,i], i = z + 1, ..., n. By replacing
τi with
TPRAC
E[βt,i]
in
∑n
i=z+1 τi = b + ǫ, we can show that
TPRAC ≈
b+ǫ∑
n
i=z+1
1/E[βt,i]
. Note that the approximated value
approaches the exact value by increasing b. The reason is that
the workers’ efficiency increases with increasing b.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
We express E[TSC] as a function of the computing time βt,i
of worker wi, i = 1, . . . , n, as
E[TSC] = min
d∈{k,...,n}
{
k − z
d− z
E[T(d)]
}
(15)
= min
d∈{k,...,n}
{
b
d− z
E[βt,d]
}
, (16)
where wd is the d
th fastest worker. Next, we find a lower bound
on E[TSC]− E [TPRAC ] as follows
E[TSC]− E [TPRAC ] =
b
d−z
E[βt,d]
−
b+ ǫ∑n
i=z+1
1
E[βt,i]
(17)
=
b
d−z
E[βt,d]
−
b+ ǫ∑d
i=z+1
1
E[βt,i]
+
∑n
i=d+1
1
E[βt,i]
(18)
≥
b
d−z
E[βt,d]
−
b+ ǫ
(d− z) 1
E[βt,d]
+ (n− d) 1
E[βt,n]
(19)
=
b(n−d)
E[βt,n]
− ǫ(d−z)
E[βt,d]
d−z
E[βt,d]
( d−z
E[βt,d]
+ n−d
E[βt,n]
)
(20)
=
bx− ǫy
y(x+ y)
, (21)
where x = n−d
E[βt,n]
and y = d−z
E[βt,d]
and the inequality (19)
comes from the fact that z ≤ k ≤ d ≤ n and the workers are
ordered from the fastest to the slowest.
